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Abstract  and  the  logic  behind  them.  Second,  best
Th  art  r  on analyses  of the cost  management practice (BMP) options and costs
effhstivlenes  of  three  soil  erosion  cosntrl  are specified for representative farm units in a
effectiveness  of  three  soil  erosion  control case  study area.  Third,  an integer program-
policy  alternatives,  specifically  1) uniform-  ming mdel is emloyed to simulateer  prograe
rate  cost  sharing,  2)  variable-rate  cost  shar-  smingod strategies  ne  d  allow  comparison  of
ing,  and  3) fixed  subsidy  payments  per  unit  s  s  an  a ing,  and  3) fixed  subsidy  payments per unit  their  cost  effectiveness.  Finally,  conclusions
reduction  in erosion.  A brief discussion  of the  thr  cost  effectiveness.  Finally,  c  onclusions
place  of these  alternative  subsidy  strategies  erosion  control policy.
within  the  context  of the  current  policy  en- 
vironment is presented.  Integer programming  THE SOIL EROSION CONTROL
is  employed  to  simulate  adoption  of  "best  POLICY ENVIRONMENT
management  practices"  (BMPs)  on  a  set  of  Though regulatory or tax policy approaches
representative  farms  in  a case  study  water-  for gaining soil  erosion control are often ana-
shed in response  to these alternative  subsidy  lyzed (Taylor  and  Frohberg;  Boggess  et al.;
strategies.  Conclusions  and  policy  implica-  Walker  and Timmons;  Spurlock  and  Clifton;
tions are outlined.  or  Seale  et  al.)  and  calls  for mandatory  soil
erosion  control are increasingly  heard (Cook;
Key words: cost effectiveness,  subsidies, cost  Epp  and  Shortle),  subsidization  to  induce
sharing,  policy,  soil erosion.  voluntary adoption of BMPs appears likely to
be  the  general  policy  approach  for  the
Soil erosion  control policy  in  the United  foreseeable  future  (Sharp  and  Bromley;
States  has received  much  criticism  in recent  AAEA  Task  Force).  Subsidy programs  have
years,  with  the  cost  effectiveness  of major  generally  been  designed  to  compensate  far-
programs being questioned (USGAO).  A num-  mers by an  amount  equal to or greater than
ber  of innovative  changes  in these  programs  their  net  BMP  cost,  that  is, gross  costs  for
have been introduced or suggested. This arti-  BMP adoption less the economic  return from
cle  reports  on  comparative  analyses  of  the  on-site  productivity  benefits  of  soil  erosion
cost  effectiveness  of the traditional  strategy  control,  though  Michalson  and  Brooks  have
of uniform-rate  cost sharing  to induce volun-  argued for off-site damages  as a basis for sub-
tary adoption of soil erosion  control practices  sidy amounts. Cost effectiveness  in the use of
and two alternative subsidy strategies. One is  public  funds for  subsidization  is  a matter  of
variable-rate  cost  sharing,  where  rates  de-  concern because these funds are limited.
pend on characteristics of the practice and the  The  question  of  how  to  define  cost  effec-
field to which it is applied.  The other involves  tiveness  with  regard  to  soil  erosion  control
offering  a  fixed  subsidy  per  ton  of  erosion  has  received  a  great  deal  of  attention
reduction.  The  primary hypothesis  tested  is  (USGAO).  Ideally,  cost  effectiveness  should
that cost effectiveness is improved in shifting  be defined in terms  of damages  avoided, both
from uniform-  to variable-rate  cost sharing to  on-  and 'off-site.  However,  given  the  limita-
the  fixed  subsidy  payment  approach.  What  tions  on  such  information,  the  focus  in  this
follows  first  is a discussion  of the policy  en-  study is on  cost effectiveness  as reflected by
vironment  in  which  these  alternatives  arose  cost per unit reduction  in the annual average
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21erosion rate based on the Universal Soil Loss  result,  some  ACP  funds  are  now being  tar-
Equation (USLE).  geted to highly erosive watersheds and coun-
The  Agricultural  Conservation  Program  ties.  In addition,  a pilot Variable  Cost-Share
(ACP),  the  primary  federal  effort  to  en-  Level (VCSL) program is being implemented
courage  soil  erosion  control,  employs  a cost-  (USGAO).
sharing  approach  for offering subsidies.  Uni-  As initially designed, one of two forms of the
form cost sharing at a 50 percent rate was the  VCSL option could  be employed by counties.
rule  until  recently,  regardless  of  the  par-  In one,  cost-sharing rates  were based  on the
ticular  situation  and  characteristics  of  the  initial erosion rate and the percentage reduc-
farmer,  the rate  of erosion on the field to  be  tion achieved in the erosion rate. This percent-
treated,  or the particular  BMP to be applied.  age  erosion  reduction  (PER) form was  later
This  is  true  even  though  the minimum  per-  modified  to  consider  differing  soil  loss
centage  cost-share  necessary to  induce adop-  tolerance  or T-values  across  soils,  reflecting
tion  of  BMPs  may  , vary  greatly  across  the idea that a ton of erosion reduction is more
farmers,  fields,  and practices  (Mitchell et  al.;  valuable on some (generally shallow) soils than
Johnson et al.). As a riesult, under uniform cost  on other soils, due to the importance of on-site
sharing some farmers receive "rents," that is,  damages.1 Percentage reduction, as estimated
cost-share  payments  in  excess  of  their  net  by  pre-  and  post-practice  application  of the
BMP  costs.  Walker  and Timmons  found that  USLE,  is  multiplied  by  the  appropriate
under  a  uniform  per  acre  subsidy  approach  "weighting"  factor (Table  1) to arrive  at the
these "rents" may be quite  sizable.  cost-sharing  rate.  The  maximum  cost-share
In  a more formal sense,  the inability or un-  rate allowed  is 75  percent.  For example, ter-
willingness of ACP administrators to practice  races which  reduce the erosion rate on a field
perfect price  discrimination  (i.e., eliminate all  with T =  5 from  12 to 6 tons per acre per year
"rents") in their role as a monopsonist buyer  (a 50  percent reduction)  would qualify for  40
of  soil  erosion  control  leads  to total  subsidy  percent  cost  sharing  (50 percent  x  0.8  =  40
payment costs in excess of the minimum amount  percent).
necessary to induce any particular level of soil  TABLE 1.  WEIGHTING  FACTORS  FOR  PERCENTAGE  EROSION
erosion  control.  Rents  could  be  reduced  to  REDUCTION  FORM  OF  VARIABLE  COST-SHARE  LEVEL
zero if cost-sharing rates could be varied on a  OPTION  IN  THE  AGRICULTURAL  CONSERVATION  PRO-
field-by-field  basis as additional increments of  GRAM,1983
erosion reduction  were sought.  Some  studies  Prepractice erosion
have argued for this (Johnson et al.) or defined  rate (tons  per acre  T-value
"optimal"  cost-sharing  rates  in  this  way  per year)T=2  T=3  T=4  T=5
(Bouwes  et  al.).  However,  administrative  20 +  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3
costs and political  constraints restrict the ex-  18+  thru  20  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.2
tent to which such price discrimination in cost-  16+  thru  18  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.1 14+  thru  16  1.3  1.3  1.2  1.0 share rate offers can be employed (Walker and  12 + thru  14  1.3  1.3  1.0  .9
Timmons).  Use of a bidding scheme, as in the  10+  thru  12  1.3  1.1  .9  .8
8+  thru  10  1.3  1.0  .8  .7 1983 Payment-in-Kind program or the Conser-  8+  thru81  1.1  . .7  .7
vation Reserve Program of the Food Security  4 + thru  6  .9  .7  .7  .7
a
Act of 1985,  could be a way of reducing rents  4  or  less  .7  .7  0  0
with relatively  low transactions costs.  alf  prepractice  erosion  rate  is  not  in  excess  of  T,  the
The  ACP  recently  has  been  modified  in  weighting factor  is 0.
several ways in an attempt to increase  cost ef-  Source:  U.S.  Government Accounting  Office.
fectiveness. These efforts came in response to  Alternatively,  participating  counties  could
documentation that in recent years the bulk of  choose another  form of the VCSL option that
cost-sharing  funds  has been  directed toward  based cost-sharing rates on the land capability
slight erosion problems, where cost per unit of  class  (LCC) of the field to be treated.  In this
erosion  reduction  is  relatively  high.  Only  LCC  form  the  cost-sharing  rate  was  set  at
28 percent of cost-sharing funds was allocated  45 percent for class I and II land, 55 percent
for BMPs on fields estimated to be eroding at  for class III land, 65 percent for class IV land,
an annual average rate of greater than 10 tons  and  75 percent for class  VI and VII land. As
per acre, where cost per unit of erosion reduc-  under the other form of the VCSL option, no
tion  is  relatively  low  (USDA,  1980a).  As  a  cost  sharing  was  available  where  soil  loss
'According to the Soil Conservation Service, the T-value for a soil represents the maximum soil erosion rate permissible if the soil is to
sustain a high level  of economical  crop productivity for the indefinite future (USGAO).
22tolerance  was  already  being  met.  However,  and  as  it  could  conceivably  evolve  in  the
the  LCC  form  was  eliminated  as  an  option  future.  This study estimates,  for a particular
after the initial year of the program, apparently  watershed,  how public cost effectiveness  has
because  of  the  limited  number  of  counties  been or could be affected by marginal changes
employing this form and concern  about its ef-  within the subsidization approach.
fectiveness.
The  VCSL  option  can potentially  improve  BMP OPTIONS AND  COSTS
public cost effectiveness  in three ways:  1) by  UDY  AE
eliminating  cost  sharing  where  soil  loss  tol-  The  North  Fork  Forked  Deer  (NFFD)
erance  is already  being met, 2)  by encourag-  Watershed in West Tennessee, where an ACP
ing some application  of BMPs  to highly erod-  water  quality  project  was  initiated  in  1979,
ing  fields  (where  cost  per  unit  of  erosion  served as the case study area for the analyses.
reduction  is  relatively low)  which  would  not  The NFFD Watershed comprises 80,190 acres
have taken place with 50 percent cost sharing,  in  the  central  portion  of  the  Obion-Forked
and  3)  by  discouraging  some  application  of  Deer River Basin.  The project application  in-
BMPs  to  slightly  eroding  fields  (where  cost  dicates that of the 45,119 acres  of cropland in
per  unit  of  further  erosion  reduction  is  the watershed,  20,150  acres were considered
relatively  high) which would have taken place  to have a critical erosion problem, as reflected
with  50  percent  cost  sharing.2 However,  the  by their average erosion rate of 47.5 tons per
VCSL option will not necessarily reduce rents  acre  per  year  (USDA,  1980b).  Analysis  of
as a percentage  of total cost-sharing expend-  yields for the major soil type in the watershed
itures.  suggests that at such an erosion rate soybean
The  shift from uniform-rate  cost  sharing to  yields may  decline  as much  as three  bushels
the PER form of the VCSL option represents  per  acre  over  a  10-year  period  (Hunter and
a significant step in the direction of a strategy  Keller).  Water  quality  data indicate that  the
which would employ a fixed subsidy payment  NFFD  River  has experienced  high levels  of
per unit of erosion reduction.  This is because  suspended  solids  and  turbidity  and  that
under this form of the VCSL option, generally  aquatic  life and recreation  criteria have been
speaking,  the greater the erosion rate reduc-  exceeded for several pollutants. Land damage
tion, the higher the cost-sharing  rate and sub-  from  sediment  deposition  was  estimated  to
sidy payment.  A fixed  subsidy  payment  per  amount  to  $175,383  annually  for  the  water-
ton (SPT) strategy would do so proportionally.  shed (USDA, 1980b).
The appeal of this Pigouvian subsidy strategy  Fifteen  representative  farms  were  devel-
is in  assuring  that only  BMPs  with a public  oped on the basis of survey information from a
cost per  ton of erosion  reduction  lower than  random sample of 76 farm units (10 percent of
the  subsidy  payment  per  ton  would  be  the total in the NFFD Watershed)  and a Soil
adopted.  As a result, a given amount  of ero-  Conservation  Service study of the watershed
sion  reduction  would  be  achieved  at  lowest  (USDA, 1980b). The farms were differentiated
total net BMP costs, though the potential for  on  the  basis  of  soil  type  (Grenada/Loring,
substantial  "rents"  would  remain.  An  SPT  Lexington-Ruston,  Memphis),  slope  of fields
strategy, referred to as the bonus contract ap-  (0-2  percent,  2-5  percent,  5-8 percent,  8-12
proach,  did appear on  the list of alternatives  percent),  tenure  status  (owner-operator  or
developed  in the recent Resources  Conserva-  renter),  crops  (soybeans,  wheat,  corn),  live-
tion Act review and assessment of soil erosion  stock (beef cattle or not), tillage practices (con-
control policy (Brubaker and  Castle).  ventional,  reduced,  no),  and  ownership  of
As noted  earlier,  a number of studies have  earth-moving  equipment  (yes  or  no).  There
compared  efficiency,  equity,  and  other  at-  are  clearly  other  factors  which  influence
tributes  of  tax,  subsidy,  and  regulatory  farmers'  behavior with regard  to adoption of
policies  for  soil  erosion  control.  A  few  have  BMPs, such as farmers' attitudes toward con-
focused  on subsidies and  addressed the ques-  servation and their current financial situation.
tion  of principles  for  design  of variable  sub-  However,  the  above  factors  are  ones  which
sidies  or  cost-share  rates  (Walker  and  Tim-  1) could  be  expected  to  substantially  affect
mons;  Michalson  and  Brooks;  Kugler).  This  farmers' estimates of gross costs of BMPs and
study  seeks  to  address  soil  erosion  control  on-site  productivity  benefits  and  2)  were
policy  as it has actually existed and evolved,  associated with several as opposed to a single
2Cost effectiveness  may also be affected to the extent that BMPs that would have been adopted at the uniform 50 percent rate are also
adopted at either  a lower or higher rate under the VCSL option.
23farmer and thus allowed for a reasonably  small  tionships for major soils in the NFFD Water-
number of representative  farm situations.  shed  reported  in  Hunter  and  Keller.  Nor-
To  remain  relatively  consistent  with  the  malized  1982  prices based on a 10-year trend
characteristics of the ACP water quality proj-  of prices received by Tennessee farmers were
ect, which required reduction of erosion rates  employed.  No  assumptions  were  made  with
to approximately soil loss tolerance, only BMP  regard  to the possible impact  of future tech-
options  which  reduced  erosion  rates  to  less  nological  change.  On-site  benefits  were  sub-
than eight  tons per  acre  per year were  con-  tracted from gross costs to arrive at net cost
sidered. These BMP options were taken from  to  the  farmer  for  each  BMP  on  each  field.
the set available for cost sharing  in the proj-  These  productivity  benefits  differed  by  soil
ect.3 Erosion rate reductions  were estimated  type, crop, and prior tillage practice, which in-
with  the  USLE  and  information  specific  to  fluence the  initial  erosion  rate and thus  ero-
West Tennessee provided by Jent et al. Fields  sion  reductions.  Owner-operators  were
with 0-2 percent  slop'e required  no  BMPs  to  assumed  to  fully  account  for  productivity
achieve  soil  loss  tolerance.  Terraces  with  benefits,  while  renters  were  assumed  to
reduced tillage or no-till without winter cover  recognize  none.  This  is  admittedly  a  some-
were specified  as BMP options for fields with  what arbitrary assumption. However, year-to-
2-5  percent  slope.  Terraces  with  reduced  year  lease arrangements  are  relatively  com-
tillage, no-till with winter cover, or establish-  mon  in  West  Tennessee,  so  renters'  time
ment  of  permanent  vegetative  cover  were  horizons  can  be  expected  to  be  relatively
specified  as  BMP  options  on  fields  with  5-8  short. This assumption is also consistent with
percent  slope.  Establishment  of permanent  the  very  limited  participation  of rental  farm
vegetative  cover  was  the  only  BMP  option  units in the ACP.
considered  available  on fields  with 8-12  per-  These  gross  cost  and  on-site  productivity
cent slope.  benefits  allowed  specification  of net costs for
Information  from  Hunter  and  Keller,  each BMP, which indicates the minimum cost-
Blisard and Keller,  and  Ray  and  Walch  was  share  payment  required  to induce  voluntary
used  to  develop  estimates  of gross costs for  adoption.  To  arrive  at  what  cost-share  pay-
application  of each  BMP  to each  field  for a  ment  would  be  offered  under  uniform-rate
10-year  period beginning  in  1982,  discounted  cost sharing and the VCSL option, it was also
to present value in 1982 dollars at 8 percent.4 necessary  to  specify  the  cost  basis  for  cost
Based on discussion with local SCS personnel,  sharing,  which  under  the  ACP  may  differ
the gross cost of terraces was estimated to be  from gross  BMP cost.  The cost basis for cost
20 percent lower if the operator owned earth-  sharing  in  the ACP  generally  takes  into  ac-
moving equipment and thus could be expected  count only  out-of-pocket  expenses.  However,
to contribute  labor with  an opportunity  cost  for  permanent  vegetative  cover  establish-
equal to zero during periods of inactivity. The  ment,  gross  cost must  take into  account  not
gross  cost  of no-till  varied  by  crop  and  the  only out-of-pocket establishment expenses but
gross cost for winter cover varied by soil type.  also  the  differences  between  foregone  net
The gross cost of permanent vegetative cover  returns  from  row  crop  production  and  net
establishment differed by livestock enterprise  returns  from  pasture  (Ray  and  Walch).  In
and  by soil type, given the explicit considera-  some cases  then, even  100 percent  cost shar-
tion of forgone net returns from soybean pro-  ing  of  out-of-pocket  establishment  expenses
duction.  Reduced tillage,  which was required  would not induce voluntary adoption. For no-
along with terraces on some fields, was assumed  till, just the opposite occurred.  The cost basis
to  involve  zero  cost,  as  enterprise  budgets  of $18 per acre established  for cost sharing in
show little difference  in expected net returns  the  water  quality  project  was  somewhat
and  many  farmers  are  shifting  to  reduced  above our gross cost estimate, which reflected
tillage on their own.  increased  out-of-pocket  expenses  for
The  present  value  of  on-site  productivity  chemicals  and  equipment,  but  also  reduced
benefits  from  reductions  in  erosion  was  costs for labor and fuel (Ray and Walch).  For
estimated based on soil loss-productivity rela-  fields where  winter cover was required  with
3Cost effectiveness might be increased by allowing practices which do not meet this requirement. However, analyzing this particular
constraint  on cost effectiveness  was not an objective of this study.
4Alternative  assumptions  regarding  planning  horizon  and  discount  rate  would  change  the  absolute  cost  estimates  for  BMPs.
However, this would not be expected to substantially affect the relative comparison  of alternative subsidy strategies, the primary focus of
this paper.
24no-till, it was assumed a wheat crop would be  decreased from  79 percent to 59 percent if an
harvested,  and gross  BMP cost took this into  owner has earth-moving  equipment. Also, net
account.  However,  based  on  ACP  rules,  no  cost per ton  generally  decreases  as slope  in-
cost  sharing  was  available  for  winter cover.  creases using the  most cost efficient  BMP in
Terrace  costs estimated by Blisard and Keller  each slope  class, but BMP field combinations
were  used to represent  both gross BMP cost  with lower net cost per ton do not always have
and  the  cost  basis for cost  sharing.  No  cost  lower  minimum cost-share rates.
sharing was offered in the special ACP project
for reduced tillage.  CHARACTERISTICS  OF THE INTEGER
The  Grenada-Loring  soil combination  is the  PROGRAMMING  MODEL
dominant  one in the watershed  and has fields  The  information  from  the previous  section
with all  possible  slopes and  thus all possible  was  incorporated  into  an  integer  program-
BMPs.  As  such,  representative  information  ming  (IP)  model  designed  to  simulate  BMP
for this soil combination is provided in Table 2  adoption  in  response  ,to alternative  subsidy
to indicate how net cost per acre, net cost per  strategies.  BMP adoption was assumed to oc-
ton  of erosion  reduction,  and  minimum cost-  cur if the subsidy payment  offered was equal
share  rate  (necessary  to  induce  voluntary  to or greater than net BMP cost.
adoption)  vary  for  the  BMPs  across  field  In general terms,  the  IP model  was struc-
slopes  and operator  characteristics.  A few il-  tured as follows:
lustrations of the significance  of these figures
may be helpful.  The minimum cost-share rate  . m  n
necessary  to induce  voluntary adoption  of no  (1) maximize:  CijXi,
tillage  with  winter  cover  (NT/WC)  on  a  i=lJ=1
5-8  percent  slope  field  is  95  percent  for  a
renter, but 59 percent for an owner due to his  n
recognition  of  on-site  productivity  benefits.  (2) subject to:  fljXjF1,
The  minimum  cost-share  rate  for  establish-  J=1
ment of permanent vegetative cover (PVC) on 
a 5-8 percent slope field  is 65  percent for an  * 
owner  with livestock, but  177 percent for an  *
owner without livestock  due  to the assumed
lack  of  any  net  returns  from use  for  either  n
pasture  or  hay  production.  Enterprise  E  fmj Xnj  Fm
budgets  for  the  latter  indicate  negative  J=1
returns  given the prices  and  yields expected
in  this  area (Ray  and  Walch).  The  minimum  m  n
cost-share  rate  for reduced  tillage  with  ter-  (3)  E  ncijXij <  NC,
races  (RT/T)  on  a 5-8  percent  slope  field  is  i=lj=l
TABLE  2.  VARIATION  IN  COSTS FOR BMPs ON  GRENADA-LORING  SOILS IN  THE  NORTH  FORK  OF  THE FORKED  DEER WATERSHED  OF
WEST  TENNESSEE,  1982
Farm/farmer characteristics
Renter  Owner
With  neither  With  livestock  With  earth-  With  neither  With  livestock  With  earth-
livestock  nor  but  without  moving  equipment  livestock  nor  but  without  moving  equipment
earth-moving  earth-moving  but  without  earth-moving  earth-moving  but  without
equipment  equipment  livestock  equipment  equipment  livestock
Slope  of  NCPAd  MCSRC  NCPTd NCPA  MCSR  NCPT  NCPA  MCSR  NCPT  NCPA  MCSR  NCPT  NCPA  MCSR  NCPT  NCPA  MCSR  NCPT
field  BMPa  ($)  (%)  ($)  ($)  (%)  ($)  ($)  ($)  ($)  ($)  ((%  )  ($)  ($)  ($)  (
2-5%  NT  81  67  0.79  45  37  0.83  81  67  0.79  71  59  0.70  39  32  0.72  71  63  1.49
RT/T  125  100  1.16  125  100  2.23  100  80  0.93  114  91  1.06  114  91  1.08  89  71  0.83
5-8%  PVC  268  177  0.80  118  78  0.35  268  177  0.80  268  177  0.80  98  65  0.29  268  177  0.80
NT/WC 115  95  0.43  115  95  0.43  115  95  0.43  71  59  0.27  71  59  0.27  71  59  0.27
RT/T  220  100  0.81  220  100  0.81  176  80  0.65  174  79  0.64  174  79  0.64  130  59  0.48
8-12%  PVC  171  113  0.28  40  26  0.07  171  113  0.28  171  113  0.28  29  19  0.05  171  113  0.28
aBase situation  is  conventional  tillage  soybeans,  except for  2-5%  slope fields  on farms  with  livestock  where base situation  is  conventional  tillage  corn. NT
=  no  tillage; RT  = reduce tillage; T = terraces;  PVC  = permanent  vegetative cover;  and  WC  = winter cover.
bNCPA  = net  cost per  acre.
cMCSR  = minimum cost-share  rate.
dNCPT  = net  cost per  ton.
25n  ptu  =  the net cost per ton of erosion reduc-
(4)  E  csj X1j  CS1,  tion for application of BMP j to field
J=1  i,  representing  the  minimum  pay-
*  *  ment  per  ton  of  erosion  reduction
~~~*  0~* ~necessary  to induce voluntary adop-
~~~*  0~*  ~tion;  and
n  PTi the  payment  per  ton  of  erosion
E  csmXmj _  mCSm,  reduction offered  on field i.
J=l
The  objective  function  (1) involves  max-
imization  of total  erosion  reduction  for  the
NFFD Watershed as a whole. Each BMP-field
combination,  the  (0,1)  variable  Xij,  was
specified  for  an  amount  of  acreage  which
n  depended  upon the  amount  of acreage in the
(5)  E  ptijX1j'PT1,  watershed  represented  by  the  farm  unit  in
j=1l  which  the  field  was  included.  For example,
consider  application  of  a  BMP  to  a  20-acre
•.  field on a 100-acre farm unit. If this farm unit
•  . represented  1,000 acres in the watershed, this
•  . BMP-field  combination  would be  specified  in
the IP model for 200 acres. Erosion reduction,
n  Cij,  and net cost, ci,  in constraint set (3) would
E  ptXmj < PTm,  thus be calculated for a 200-acre application of
j=1  this  BMP.  The  set of constraints  labeled  (2)
limits  each  field  to  one  BMP.  As  discussed
below,  only one of the constraint sets (3),  (4),
and  (5)  is in effect  at one  time.  If more than
one BMP  satisfies the constraint for any par-
where:  ticular field, the one which maximizes erosion
reduction  is selected.
i  =  1, ..  ., m refers to field number;  The need for the IP approach can be demon-
strated  by  illustrating  how  constraint  set
j =  1,  ..,  n refers to practice  number;  (4) must function  to  simulate cost  sharing.  If
40 percent uniform cost sharing is to be simu-
Xi  =  a (0,1) variable representing applica-  lated, CS1 for field 1 would be specified as .40.
tion of BMP j to field i;  If the lowest minimum cost-share  percentage
Con  =  the erosion reduction resulting from  among the BMPs applicable to field 1 is 80 per-
application of BMP j to field i;  cent for BMP 1, cs1 would be specified as .80.
f  l  =  1o  If X1, were not a (0,1) activity, X1, could enter
on  a half-field  basis to satisfy the  constraint.
F.  =  1;  Thus,  an  integer  programming  framework
1'^~~~~~~  '  ~with  erosion reductions  and costs  on a whole-
nc.i  =  the net cost for application of BMP j  field  rather  than  a  single-acre  basis  wasre-
to field i;  quired.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
NC  =  a limit on total net cost;  ALTERNATIVE  SUBSIDY STRATEGIES
The  IP  model  was  initially  employed  to
csU  =  net cost as a percentage  of the cost  establish the "perfect price discrimination" or
basis for cost sharing for application  "no rents" baseline.  Simulation of BMP adop-
of BMP j to field i, representing the  tion in order of increasing net cost per ton of
minimum cost-share percentage nec-  erosion  reduction  was  accomplished  by
essary to induce voluntary adoption;  parametrically  varying the right-hand side of
the  net  cost  constraint  (3)  by  $100,000  in-
CSi =  the cost-share  percentage offered on  crements up to $2.6 million, at which point all
field  i;  37 fields were treated.  Results are presented
26in Table 3  and the total  cost curve is labeled  "UNIFORM"  in  Figure  1, with  individual
"BASELINE"  in  Figure  1.  Twenty  "dif-  points  on  the  curve  identified  by  cost-share
ferent"  BMPs  were represented,  that is,  the  rate.  No  BMPs  were  applied  until  the  cost-
three  basic BMPs  (no-till,  terraces,  and  per-  share rate reached 30 percent.  Information on
manent  vegetative  cover)  differentiated  by  net  costs,  erosion  reductions,  cost-share
soil,  slope,  prepractice  crop  and  tillage,  payments,  public cost per ton, and rents as a
tenure,  livestock,  and  equipment  character-  percentage of cost-share payments is provided
istics.  Generally  speaking,  the order  of BMP  in Table 4.
application  was  permanent  vegetative  cover
on higher slopes, followed by no-till, and then
terraces with reduced tillage on lower slopes.
4000
TABLE  3.  RESULTS  OF  BASELINE
a SIMULATION  OF  BMP
ADOPTION  IN  THE NORTH  FORK  OF  THE FORKED  DEER
WATERSHED  IN WEST  TENNESSEE,  1982
.70
Erosion  reduction  Net costs  Cost per ton  3000  UNIFORM  SPT ($/ton)
(%)
(1,000's of tons)  ($1,000)  ($/ton)  90
1,522  200  .13  /BASELINE
2,212  400  .18  ° 
2,755  600  .22  .60 
3,206  800  .25  0  80 3,609  1,000  .28  00  /
3,988  1,200  .30  2000
4,329  1,400  .32  .50  50
4,629  1,600  .35 
4,892  1,800  .37  70
5,136  2,000  .39  / 
5,371  2,200  .41  PER 
5,603  2,400  .43
5,783  2,600  .45  1000  .40
LCC  60 aThe  BASELINE  simulation  implicitly  assumes  perfect0 
discrimination or  no  rents and  BMP  adoption in  order of in- 
creasing  net cost per ton of erosion  reduction. 
.20
30
Uniform-Rate  Cost Sharing,  I..... if  . II  ii..  . .... i  ......... ...  II  i
0  1000  2000  3000  4000  5000  6000 Next, the  model was employed to simulate  Total Erosion  Reduction  (1,000 tons)
alternative  rates of uniform cost sharing.  The
right-hand  sides  for the minimum  cost-share  Figure  1. Comparison  of the Public  Cost Ef-
constraints  (4) were varied parametrically  by  fectiveness  of Alternative  Subsidy
10 percent increments  from  10 to 90 percent.  Strategies for BMP Adoption in the
The  resulting  total  public  (taxpayer)  cost  NFFD  Watershed  of  West  Ten-
curve for uniform-rate  cost sharing is labeled  nessee, 1982.
TABLE  4.  RESULTS  OF UNIFORM  COST-SHARING  (UNIFORM) SIMULATION  OF  BMP ADOPTION  IN  THE NORTH  FORK  OF  THE  FORKED
DEER WATERSHED  OF  WEST TENNESSEE,  1982
Cost-  Public  Rents as a per-
share  Erosion  Net  Cost-share  cost per  centage  of cost-
rate  reduction  costs  payments  tona  share  paymentsb
(%)  (1,000's  ($1,000)  ($1,000)  ($/ton)  (%)
of tons)
10  0  0  0  -
20  0  0  0  -
30  797  64  73  .09  12
40  1,487  322  402  .27  20
50  1,487  322  502  .34  36
60  1,849  489  772  .42  37
70  2,495  1,105  1,551  .62  29
80  3,515  1,613  2,207  .63  27
90  3,844  2,000  2,845  .74  30
aRepresents Cost-Share  Payments  - Erosion  Reduction.
bRepresents [Cost-Share  Payments-Net Costs]  - Cost-Share  Payments.
27The  "UNIFORM"  curve  lies  above  the  is, it is not in the BASELINE  set of 20 with
"BASELINE"  curve for two distinct reasons.  lowest net cost per ton.  Consider the case of
First,  as  the  uniform  cost-share  rate  is  in-  an  owner-operator  with livestock  and earth-
creased,  rents are paid  in cases where BMPs  moving  equipment  growing  reduced  tillage
would have been adopted at a lower cost-share  soybeans on Grenada-Loring  soil with 5-8 per-
rate. For example, rents represent 30 percent  cent slope. Although net cost per ton for per-
($845,000)  of  cost-share  payments  at  the  manent vegetative cover is $0.55 compared to
90  percent  cost-share  rate.  Second,  uniform-  $1.00  for  terraces,  the  minimum  cost-share
rate cost sharing results in two types of social  rate  is 78  percent  for permanent  vegetative
cost  inefficiencies.  These  inefficiencies  ac-  cover  compared  to  69  percent  for  terraces.
count  for  the  additional  amount  by  which  This is due primarily to the lack of accounting
UNIFORM  lies  above  BASELINE,  almost  for foregone soybean revenue in the cost basis
$900,000 at the 90 percent cost-share  rate, for  for  cost  sharing  on  permanent  vegetative
example.  cover.  This  type  of  social  cost  inefficiency
The  first  type  of  social  cost  inefficiency  could also occur without a divergence between
associated  with  uniform-rate  cost  sharing  the cost basis for cost sharing and gross  cost.
stems  from the order  of BMP  adoption.  Net
cost per ton,  an estimate  of social  cost,  is not  The Varable Cost-Share  Level  Option
perfectly correlated with minimum cost-share  To  simulate  the Variable  Cost-Share  Level
rate across  BMPs.  For example,  adoption  of  (VCSL)  option,  the  right-hand  sides  for the
no-till  (from  conventional  till)  corn  by  an  -minimum  cost-share  constraints  (4) were  set
owner-operator  on  Grenada-Loring  soil  with  at levels  dictated  by  each  of the  two  forms
2-5 percent slope has the 15th highest net cost  (PER  and  LCC).  The simulation  of the  per-
per  ton  among  the  20  BMPs  in  the  BASE-  centage  erosion  reduction  (PER)  form
LINE  solution  but  is  adopted  third  in  the  resulted  in just  one  point  in  terms  of total
UNIFORM  solution  with  a  minimum  cost-  public cost and erosion reduction, rather than
share  rate  of  32  percent.  This  result  is  due  a curve.  The  same was the case for the land
primarily  to the  fact  that the  cost  basis  for  capability  class (LCC) form. (See Table  5 and
cost  sharing  is well  above gross cost  as esti-  Figure  1.) Based on extrapolation between the
mated for this  study,  though  such a divergence  60 percent and 70 percent cost-share levels on
is not necessary for uniform-rate  cost sharing  UNIFORM,  total public  cost under the PER
to generate an inefficient order of BMP adopt-  form  of  the  VCSL  option  was  10.6  percent
ion in terms of social cost. In addition, renting  lower than under a 69.4 percent uniform cost-
leads  to this type  of social  cost inefficiency  if  share  rate.  This  increased  cost  effectiveness
on-site  benefits  assumed  to be  unrecognized  was  primarily  due  to cost-share  rates  under
by  renters  are  considered  a  social  benefit.  the  PER  form  of  only  59  percent  for  no-till
That  is,  less  cost  efficient  BMPs  will  be  (from  conventional  till) corn  on Grenada  soil
adopted by owner-operators before  most cost  with 2-5  percent  slope,  which  was still  high
efficient BMPs by renters.  enough to induce  adoption.  Public cost under
The  second  type  of social  cost  inefficiency  the  LCC  form  was  6.6  percent  higher than
associated  with  uniform-rate  cost  sharing  under  a  57  percent  uniform  cost-share  rate.
stems from adoption of a BMP which is not the  The  reduced  cost  effectiveness  in  this  case
socially cost  efficient  BMP for the field;  that  was  primarily  due  to  cost-share  rates  under
TABLE  5.  RESULTS  FROM  SIMULATIONS  OF  BMP  ADOPTION  UNDER  THE  VCSL OPTION  IN  THE  NORTH  FORK  OF  THE  FORKED  DEER
WATERSHED  OF  WEST TENNESSEE,  1982
Form  Rents  as a
of  percentage  of
VCSL  Erosion  Net  Cost-share  Public cost  cost-share
option  reduction  costs  payments  per tona  paymentsb
(1,000's  ($1,000)  ($1,000)  ($/ton)  (%)
of tons)
PERC  2,457  945  1,346  .55  30
LCCd  1,742  414  738  .42  44
aRepresents Cost-Share  Payments  - Erosion  Reduction.
bRepresents [Cost-Share  Payments-Net Costs]  - Cost-Share Payments.
CPercentage erosion  reduction.
dLand capability class.
28LCC  of 75 percent for permanent vegetative  cost  efficient order  of BMP application is not
cover on 8-12 percent  sloping  fields of farms  followed.  Under  both  forms,  the  top  three
with livestock, when only 26 percent to 31 per-  ranked  BMPs  from the  BASELINE  set  are
cent cost-share rates were required  to induce  included  but  the  next  most  highly  ranked
adoption.  BMP under either form  is the 12th  one.
It  is  of  interest  to  note  that  public  cost  A Fixed Subsidy Payment Per Unit Reduction
under  the  PER  form  of  the  VCSL  option  i  i  i 
would  have  been  lower  and thus  even  more  s  p  r  o  ie would  have  been  lower  and thus  even  more  Finally, to simulate a strategy offering a fixed
cost  effective  relative  to  uniform-rate  cost  subsidy  payment  per  unit  reduction  in  ero-
sharing,  had the weighting factors in the cost-  sion,  the right-hand  sides  of the net cost per
share  rate formula  not  been  modified  to  re-  ton  constraint  set  (5)  were  varied  para-
flect  differing  T-values.  An  initial  set  of  metrcally from $.10 per ton  f erosion  reduc-
simulations  was  done  prior  to  this  T-value  tion to $1.50 in increments of $.10. Results are
modification, which essentailly increased cost-  presented in Table 6 for the simulations up to
share rates for soils with T-values of less than  $1.00.  The curve rereesenting this strategy is
five. This modification led to BMP application  labeled  SPT in Figure  ,  ith individual points
on several fields with slopes of 2-5 percent, as  identified by the subsidy payment per ton of
well  as  higher  cost-share  rates  on  several  erosion  reduction.  The  SPT strategy  secures
fields  on  which  BMPs  were  applied  at  the  the  same  erosion  reduction  as  50  percent
original  rates  before  the  modification.  Total  uniform-rate  cost  share rates at 20.3  percent
erosion reduction increased by 17 percent as a  lower public cost,  the same erosion reduction
result  of the  modification,  but  at a marginal  as 75 percent uniform-rate cost sharing at 29.2
cost  of  $1.187  per  ton  erosion  reduction,  percent lower public cost.
almost  three times  the average  cost  of $.441  The lower costs under SPT result exclusively
for  the  erosion  reduction  gained  with  the  from elimination of the social  cost inefficiencies
original weighting factors of the PER form.  in terms of the BMP set and order of adoption.
Another basis for evaluating  the VCSL op-  Rents are actually  16 percent  greater under
tion is to compare  public  cost per ton of ero-  SPT  than  with  50  percent  uniform-rate  cost
sion reduction under the PER and LCC forms  sharing  and  17  percent  greater  under  SPT
with that of 75  percent uniform  cost  sharing  than with  75  percent  uniform-rate  cost shar-
(as  indicated  by  the  point  labeled  "75"  in  ing.  The  reason  for  the  higher  rents  is  il-
Figure  1),  which is the rate generally paid  in  lustrated by the following comparisons.  Total
targeted  water  quality  projects.  Given  the  erosion  reduction  with  a  30 percent  uniform
maximum  75  percent  cost-share  rate  in  the  cost-share  rate  and  total  erosion  reduction
VCSL option, PER and LCC would be viewed  with a $.10 per ton fixed subsidy payment are
as offering  reduced  rates  of cost  sharing for  approximately  equal,  as  are  total  erosion
BMP application  on less  highly  erosive  land.  reduction  with  a  90  percent  uniform  cost-
Though erosion reduction would be 18 percent  share rate and total erosion reduction  with a
lower under PER as compared  to 75 percent  $.60 per ton fixed subsidy payment (Figure 1).
uniform-rate  cost sharing,  public cost per ton  Thus, to secure the higher of these two levels
of erosion reduction for PER would be 13 per-  of total  erosion  reduction  under  UNIFORM
cent lower, $.55 compared to $.63. Though ero-  by inducing  additional  BMP  adoption with  a
sion  reduction  would  be  42  percent  lower  90 percent cost-share rate, farmers who would
under LCC  as compared to uniform-rate  cost  have participated at the lower 30 percent cost-
sharing,  public cost  per ton of erosion  reduc-  share  rate  would  receive  three  times  the
tion for LCC  would be 33 percent lower,  $.42  minimum payment necessary  to induce  adop-
compared  to  $.63.  Similar  comparisons  could  tion. On the other hand,  to secure this higher
be made with the typical 50 percent uniform-  level  of total  erosion  reduction  under  SPT,
rate cost sharing of the ACP.  some  farmers  would  receive  six  times  ($.60
Points representing both forms of the VCSL  versus $.10)  the minimum payment necessary
option lie well above the BASELINE curve in  to induce adoption.
Figure  1  for  the  same  reasons  that  UNI-  Comparisons of SPT with the VCSL option
FORM lies above BASELINE.  Rents account  are  also  of interest.  For achievement  of the
for 30 percent of public cost under PER and 44  same  total  erosion  reductions,  SPT  requires
percent  under LCC.  In addition,  the  socially  expenditure  of 29 percent less in public funds
5Payment  levels above $1.00 per ton resulted in  very small  additional reductions  in erosion.
29than  PER  and  38  percent  less  than  LCC.  TABLE 6.  RESULTS  OF SUBSIDY PAYMENT  PER TON  (SPT) SIMULATION  OF Rents  under  SPT  are  17 percent higher than  BMP  ADOPTION  IN  THE  NORTH  FORK  OF  THE  FORKED  DEER Rents under SPT are  17 percent higher  than  TENNESSE  1982
under PER and 26 percent lower than under 
LCC. As in the comparison with uniform-rate  rents  as  a percentage of
cost sharing, most of the increased public cost  Payment  Erosion  Net  Subsidy  Public  cost  subsidy
effectiveness from SPT derives from elimina-  per  unit  reduction  costs  payments  per ton
a paymentsb
tion of social  cost inefficiencies  regarding the  ($/ton)  (1,000's  ($1,000)  ($1,000)  ($/ton)  (6)
of tons) set of BMPs  adopted.  .10  797  64  80  .10  20
.20  1,228  120  246  .20  51
.30  2,118  367  777  .30  53
CONCLUSIONS  AND  POLICY  .40  2,653  556  1,061  .40  48 .50  3,682  1,036  1,841  .50  44
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOIL EROSION  .60  4,023  1,225  2,414  .60  49
.70  4,476  1,531  3,133  .70  51 CONTROL POLICY  .80  5,008  2,189  4,006  .80  45
.90  5,497  2,612  4,947  .90  47
In drawing  conclusions from the findings of  1.00  5,869  2,988  5,869  1.00  49
this study, important assumptions and limita-  aRepresents  Subsidy  Payments  3/4 Erosion  Reduction.
tions,  particularly those  regarding factors in-  bRepresents  [Subsidy Payments-Net  Costs] 3/4 Subsidy  Payments.
fluencing  farmers'  perceptions  of  net  BMP
cost  and  decision  rules  for  BMP  adoption,  relative to off-site damages. However,  a com-
must  be  recognized.  However,  the  primary  prehensive evaluation of the PER form would
purpose  of the study was not to estimate the  require  consideration  of  the  increased  ad-
actual  cost  of gaining  particular  amounts  of  ministrative costs incurred in estimating ero-
erosion  control,  but  rather  to  estimate  the  sion rates anderosion reductions.  Conclusions
relative  cost effectiveness  of alternative  sub-  about  the  advisability  of expanding  variable
sidy strategies. Violation of assumptions could  cost  sharing  within  the  ACP  must  await
affect  absolute  magnitudes  of costs  greatly,  evaluation  of actual  field  experience  in  par-
but relative  cost differences to a much lesser  ticipating  counties.  Whether  variable  cost
degree. As such, the following conclusions and  sharing can  develop and maintain  acceptability
policy  implications appear appropriate.  is  uncertain  because  it appears  to "reward"
Uniform-rate  cost  sharing  imposes  a  sub-  those  farmers  who practice  less  erosion con-
stantial limitation  on the cost effectiveness of  trol.  In  addition,  its  effectiveness  may  be
federal  soil  erosion  control  policy  because  limited because  both  farmers  and SCS tech-
minimum cost-share rates necessary to induce  nicians  may  have  some  incentive  to  see  a
BMP  adoption  differ  widely  by  BMP  and  higher initial erosion rate generated or to err
across  land  and  operator  characteristics.  At  on the high side in the judgments necessary in
the typical 50 percent rate of cost sharing, the  specifying  factors in  the Universal  Soil Loss
combination  of rents and  social  inefficiencies  Equation (USLE).  A high research priority is,
in  the  BMP  set served  to more  than  double  thus, analysis  of the VCSL option with actual
public  cost  per  ton  of  erosion  reduction  program participation  data.
relative  to the theoretical minimum,  ignoring  The  SPT  strategy offering  a fixed subsidy
administrative costs. The social cost inefficien-  payment per ton of erosion reduction resulted
cies  resulted  primarily  from  using  out-of-  in  substantial  increases  in  public  cost  effec-
pocket  expenses  as  the  cost  basis  for  cost  tiveness relative  to uniform-rte  cost sharing
~~~sh  ~aring.  ^  and the VCSL option, supporting the primary
The PER form of the VCSL option modestly  hypothesis  of the  study.  This  occurred  pri-
increased public cost effectiveness  relative to  marily due  to elimination of social-cost  ineffi-
uniform-rate  cost  sharing,  supporting  the  ciencies  in the  BMP  set rather  than from  a
primary  hypothesis  of  the  study,  while  the  reduction  in  rents.  Thus,  the  SPT  strategy
discontinued  LCC  form  actually  reduced  may be  viewed  as a way  of dealing with the
public  cost  effectiveness.  The  increase  in  out-of-pocket expense problem. The feasibility
public  cost  effectiveness  with the PER form  of such  a strategy has  been increased  by im-
would  have  been  greater  with  the  original  plementation  of, and several years experience
weighting  factors,  as  the  T-value  modifica-  with,  the  VCSL  option,  which  broke  the
tions resulted in relatively high marginal costs  "uniformity" barrier, both philosophically and
for  reductions  in  erosion  on  fields  with  administratively,  and  relies  on  estimation  of
T-values less than five and slight erosion prob-  erosion rates with the  USLE. However,  the
lems.  Whether  this  trade-off  is  justified  cost  "sharing"  approach  surely  maintains  a
depends  upon  the  value  of  on-site  damages  good deal  of sanctity even yet.
30An  SPT  strategy  clearly  has  attractive  BMP adoption,  rents in total public costs  for
features  if  cost  effectiveness  is  measured  erosion reduction could be largely eliminated.
strictly in terms of public cost per ton of ero-  Research  on  the  expected  performance  of
sion  reduction.  The  T-value  modifications  in  such a bidding scheme  within the ACP would
the weighting factors for the PER form of the  be useful.
VCSL option  reflect the idea that cost  effec-  The evident willingness  on the part of ACP
tiveness should be defined more broadly.  Dif-  administrators  to  consider  and  even  experi-
fering  on-site  damages  could  be  reflected  ment  with  innovative  subsidy  strategies
similarly  in  an  SPT  strategy  by  specifying  portends well for future improvements  in the
higher  payment  levels  for  soils  with  lower  cost  effectiveness  of federal  soil  erosion  con-
T-values.  trol policy. As could be expected, the growing
The  establishment  of  the  Conservation  demand for accountability  with regard to the
Reserve  Program  for  retirement  of  highly  product of programs like the ACP and the in-
eroding cropland by the Food Security Act of  creasing  scarcity  in  real  terms  of the  basic
1985 suggests that a bidding approach for cost  resource in this particular production process,
sharing on all BMPs could be politically viable.  funds  for technical  assistance  and cost  shar-
If farmers'  bids  approached  their  minimum  ing, together are serving to induce significant
cost-share  rate  required  to  induce  voluntary  institutional  change in this policy area.
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